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Abstract
The marginal cost of public funds deﬁned as the ratio between the shadow
priceoftaxrevenuesandthepopulationaverageofthesocialmarginalutility
of income, is analysed within an explicit cost–beneﬁt context. It is shown
that for an optimal tax system the measure is always equal to one. Beneﬁt
and cost measures congruent with this deﬁnition are derived. Under optimal
taxes a positive net social beneﬁt is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
project that passes the cost–beneﬁt test. Under non–optimal taxes this is not
the case: If taxes are too low a positive net social beneﬁt is a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition and if taxes are too high a suﬃcient but not necessary
condition for an accepted project.
JEL: H21, H43.
Keywords: Cost–beneﬁt, optimal taxation, marginal cost of public funds.
∗Correspondence to Michael Lundholm, email <mlu@ne.su.se>. Address: Department of
Economics, Stockholm University, SE–106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. I am grateful to Agnar
Sandmo for comments on a previous version of this paper.1 Introduction
The term ‘marginal cost of public funds’ (MCPF) is a problematic term in the
cost–beneﬁt literature. Diﬀerent economic concepts originating from diﬀerent re-
search questions have come to compete about the term. Most frequently, however,
it seems that the marginal cost of public funds is the answer to the following
question: By which factor should the marginal resource cost of a public project
be scaled to take into account that the project is ﬁnanced through distortionary
taxation? Or in the words of Arthur Pigou:
“The raising of an additional £ of revenue necessitates increasing
the tax rates at which taxation is imposed, either now or (if resort has
been had to loans) subsequently. With some sorts of taxes this inﬂicts
indirect damage on the tax payers as a body above the loss they suﬀer
in actual money payment. When there is indirect damage, it ought to
be added to the direct loss of satisfaction involved in the withdrawal
of the marginal unit of resources by taxation, before this is balanced
against the satisfaction yielded by the marginal expenditure.”
Pigou (1947, p. 33–34)
Although it may seem to be a straight forward question to answer this is not
the case. Ballard and Fullerton (1992) identiﬁed two diﬀerent traditions; the
Harberger-Pigou–Browning–tradition in which the marginal cost of public funds
is always larger than unity and the Dasgupta–Stiglitz–Atkinson–Stern–tradition in
which it may be larger or lower than one. In the ﬁrst tradition the marginal project
is a lump sum transfer to a representative consumer ﬁnanced by a distortionary
tax. A marginal cost of public funds greater than unity then occurs because the
dead–weight loss of taxation. In the second the marginal project is arbitrarily de-
ﬁned. The size of the marginal cost of public funds then depends on factors such
as, e.g., whether the tax system is optimal or if non–optimal which the marginal
source of ﬁnancing is. It may even be lower than unity because then a small
perturbation of the tax system will create income eﬀects that may increase gov-
ernment tax revenues (due to normality of leisure). Ballard and Fullerton (1992)
also illustrated that the fact that the MCPF may never be lower than unity in the
ﬁrst tradition but may be lower in the second has caused considerable confusion
among economists. But it is clear that the ﬁrst intuition behind Pigou’s statement
is not generally correct.
Regardless of tradition it seems, however, that the starting point is an ideal
situation where a policy maker has access to a ﬁrst best tax system. If taxes are
not ideal in this sense, how must the criteria for a correct decision be altered due
to the presence of the distortionary tax system? If b0 is the private marginal beneﬁt
1and c0 the private marginal cost of a project, then the optimal project size for under




If taxes are distortionary, the perspective in the literature related to marginal cost
of public funds has been to rewrite this cost-beneﬁt test, typically as
b
0 = ˆ ηC
0, (2)
where ˆ η is the marginal cost of public funds and C0 is the marginal shadow cost
of the project. Still, the left–hand side only consists of the private marginal ben-
eﬁts. In a sense, therefore, the perspective is a mix between of a private decision
maker and a public policy maker. This is reﬂected in the MCPF which captures
the trade-oﬀ between the value of additional tax revenues to the policy maker ver-
sus the value to individual of additional lump sum income; i.e, the ratio between
the marginal shadow price of tax revenues and the individual marginal utility of
income.
This paper takes as its starting point another quotation from Pigou:
“The government is not, therefore, simply an agent for carrying
out on behalf of its citizens their several separate instructions; it can-
not simply balance at the margin each man’s desire to buy battleships
against his desire to by clothes, in the way the individual that an in-
dividual balances his desire for clothes against his desire for coal. As
the agent of its citizens collectively, it must exercise coercion upon
them individually, securing the funds it needs either by a contempo-
rary tax or by a loan associated by a subsequent tax to provide for
interest and sinking fund.”
Pigou (1947, p. 33)
Then, to capture that the cost–beneﬁt decision is made by a policy maker using
coercion we let the presence of distortionary taxation aﬀect both the beneﬁt side




where B0 is the social marginal beneﬁt, C0 is the social shadow cost of the project
and where η is called social marginal cost of public funds (SMCPF). The SMCPF
is diﬀerent from the MCPF and captures the trade-oﬀ between the value of ad-
ditional tax revenues to the policy maker versus the policy maker’s valuation of
additional income to the individual. Which are the beneﬁts to society of providing
2the individual with a marginal unit of lump sum income? The answer to this ques-
tion is given by social marginal utility of income introduced by Diamond (1975).
The SMPC can therefore be deﬁned to be the ratio between the marginal shadow
price of tax revenues and the social marginal utility of income to the representative
individual. As consequence we have on the beneﬁt side the social marginal beneﬁt
deﬁned as the trade-oﬀ between the social marginal value of the project (which
we assume equals the private marginal utility) versus social marginal utility of
income.
This deﬁnition of the social marginal cost of public funds will then, within a
representative individual framework, be identical to a measure of marginal cost of
public funds given by Håkonsen (1998, equation (7)). In this paper a generalisa-
tion to an economy with a heterogeneous population is oﬀered, so that SMPC is
deﬁned as the ratio between the marginal shadow price of tax revenues and the
average social marginal utility of income in the economy. Also we analyse op-
timal as well as non–optimal taxes. The fact that Håkonsen (1998) analysed his
measure in a representative individual framework and assumed optimal taxes (in a
very speciﬁc and restricted sense) will make his measure have diﬀerent properties
compared to the the generalised measure analysed here. In this paper this deﬁ-
nition is put into the context of an explicit cost–beneﬁt problem and generalised
to an economy with a heterogeneous population, so that SMPC is deﬁned as the
ratio between the marginal shadow price of tax revenues and the average social
marginal utility of income in the economy.
Whereas the the measure analysed by Håkonsen (1998) always was larger than
unity (unless the elasticity of substitution is zero and the measure equals unity),
the generalised social marginal cost of public funds will always be equal to unity
foranyoptimaltaxsystem. Thismeansevenifataxsystemishighlydistortionary,
the social marginal cost of public funds is equal to one if the tax system is optimal.
Also, if taxes are non–optimal the measure is not restricted to be above unity. The
unityresultunderan optimaltaxsystemisina sensenotsurprisingsincethesocial
marginal cost of public funds (deﬁned for any speciﬁc model) being equal to unity
can be shown to be a necessary condition for an optimal tax system in the same
model. The reason is that a necessary condition for optimality is that it should
not be possible to increase the value of the policy maker’s objective function by
disturbing the tax system (i.e., move income from the individual to the public
sector or vice versa). Since the change in the objective function of moving lump
sum income on the margin from the individual to the public sector is the marginal
shadow price of tax revenues minus the social marginal utility of income the result
follows. The social marginal cost of public funds under any optimal tax system
will therefore have the same property as the marginal cost of public funds under a
ﬁrst best optimal tax system, i.e., be equal to unity.
3Does this mean that there is no role for the concept of marginal cost of public
funds? The answer is no for the simple reason that, of course, taxes may not be
optimal. Then the interpretation is that the social marginal cost of public funds
measures the deviation from an optimal tax system: If the overall level of taxation
is in a sense too high, then the social marginal cost of public funds is less than a
critical value and the cost beneﬁt test tend to accept marginal projects for which
the social marginal beneﬁt is less than the marginal shadow cost. If the overall
leveloftaxationistoohighthesocialmarginalcostofpublicfundsishigherthana
critical value and the cost beneﬁt test tend turn down marginal costs unity. Hence,
the social marginal costs should be scaled down. Similarly, if the overall burden
of taxation is too small in the sense that a marginal lump sum tax is desirable
then social marginal costs should be scaled up. That is, if optimal taxes are out of
reach for the policy maker then the public projects should be used to compensate
for that.
Accordingly, undernon–optimaltaxesanewlevelsissueisintroduced. Instead
of the problem whether a second best optimal taxation implies a lower level of the
public project compared to ﬁrst best we can now ask whether a certain type of
non–optimal taxes implies a higher or lower level of the public project compared
to the second best optimal solution.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2 the model is presented. The
social marginal cost of public funds is deﬁned in section 3 and the social marginal
beneﬁts and costs in section 4. The relevant criterion for cost–beneﬁt analysis
under an optimal tax system is derived in section 5. The same criterion under a
non–optimal tax system is derived in section 6. Section 7 contains conclusions.
2 Model
The model used in this paper is exactly the model analysed by Sandmo (1998).
In this economy there is a private good x, labour supply ` and a public good
project g. The private good is produced by a linear production technology so that
the producer prices are ﬁxed. User charges for the public good are assumed to
be unfeasible on technical or political grounds. Therefore, the public project is
ﬁnanced through taxation. With two taxable commodities we express the problem
as if labour income is taxed. We assume that the policy maker is restricted to
use a linear income tax with the lump tax parameter α and the proportional tax
parameter β.
There are n individuals all who have the same preferences represented by the
strictly concave utility function u : R3
+ → R deﬁned by ui = u(xi,`i,g). The policy
maker is assumed to have choosen that speciﬁc cardinal transformation of the
individuals’ utility function which reﬂects the policy maker’s degree of inequality
4aversion. An individual then solves the problem
max
xi,`i
u(xi,`i,g) s.t. (1 − β)wi`i = xi + α, (4)
where the price on private consumption is numeraire and normalised to unity and
wi is the wage rate (labour productivity) of type i = 1,...,n. The Lagrangian
function can be written as
L(xi,`i,λi) = u(xi,`i,g) + λi

(1 − β)wi`i − pxi − α

, (5)






























i(1 − β)wi = 0 and (6b)
∂L
∂λi




i − α = 0, (6c)
where x∗
i = xi (α,β,g), `∗
i = `∗
i(α,β,g) and λ∗ = λ(α,β,g), the latter being the
marginal utility of income in the optimal point. We get the indirect utility func-
tion by inserting the optimal demand for private consumption and optimal labour











































Suppose the policy maker has choosen the policy optimally. In such cases
the government chooses the tax system and the size of the public project so as to
















where c(g) the total direct cost of the public project g. That is, this is the cost that
would have been incurred by a private decision maker undertaking the project.
5The function c : Rn
+ → R is assumed to be strictly increasing in g and strictly

















     , (10)
where κ is the Lagrange multiplier (i.e., the marginal social welfare or shadow







































































− c(g) = 0. (11d)
3 The social marginal cost of public funds
Generally there is a great degree of arbitrariness in the deﬁnitions of the marginal
cost of public funds (MCPF). On reason is diﬀerent views on how indirect eﬀects
of the public project and its ﬁnancing on tax revenues should be treated. Some
of the early literature included these feed–back eﬀects into the deﬁnition of the
marginal costs of public funds, making this concept depending not only on the
marginal ﬁnancing instrument but also the the public project that the tax increase
ﬁnanced; see, e.g., Hansson(1984).1 Thealternative, representedby, e.g., Sandmo
(1998), is to make a distinction between the marginal cost of public funds and the
social marginal cost of the project (i.e., its marginal shadow price) and include the
feedback eﬀects in the latter. Regardless of this, however, the typical question in
the literature is the following: The government is changing a certain tax so that
tax revenues increase with one dollar which is spent on a public project. Which
is the policy maker’s valuation of the additional tax revenue, when its alternative
cost is measured as the representative consumer’s valuation of the margin unit of
income?
1Hansson (1984) clearly derives project speciﬁc marginal cost of public funds. The above
mentioned indirect eﬀects may only, however, be present in the in the case of infrastructure invest-
ments. The extent to which that is the case is, however, undocumented.
6In this paper a diﬀerent question is asked: Which is the policy maker’s valua-
tion of the additional tax revenue, when its alternative cost is measured as the pol-
icy maker’s valuation of marginal unit of income to the representative consumer?
This diﬀerent question will lead to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of the marginal cost of
public funds, called the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCPF) which will
allow us to present the government’s cost–beneﬁt test in an intuitive way (see sec-
tions 4 and 5) as well as relating this SMCPF to the optimality properties of the
tax system (see below and section 6).
To deﬁne the SMCPF we need two things, (i) the marginal social welfare of
tax revenues when a speciﬁc tax instrument is used to raise the revenue and (ii)
the policy maker’s evaluation of the alternative use of the additional dollar of tax
revenues raised. For the present model we can deﬁne the marginal social welfare



























In an optimal tax system the marginal social welfare of tax revenues must be same
for all ﬁnancing sources; else the tax system is not optimal and the policy maker
could change the composition of taxes in order to increase social welfare. It then
follows from (11a) and (11b) that under an optimal tax system
κα = κβ = κ
∗, (13)
where κ∗ is the Lagrange multiplier in the policy maker’s decision problem evalu-
ated in the optimal point.
To a private individual the value of a unit of lump sum income is the marginal
utility of income. Under a ﬁrst best tax system this private valuation coincides
with the policy maker’s valuation. We must, however, ﬁnd the value to the pol-
icy maker of this marginal tax revenue under a second best tax system. In the
present model we ask what is the eﬀect on social welfare eﬀect of reducing α
marginally? All individuals then receive a marginal unit of lump sum income.
They re-optimise in response and change their labour supply via income eﬀects
and therefore also change their income tax payments. The eﬀects of this thought
experiment are captured by the social marginal utility of income to individual
i = 1,...,n, deﬁned by Diamond (1975).2 Depending on model the deﬁnition
2Note that the social marginal utility of consumption is the policy maker’s valuation of the
private marginal utility of income. The social marginal utility of income is the social marginal







i = 1,...,n. (14)
If the tax system is optimal κα is replaced by κ∗. Then the value of the alternative








Now, let Z denote the set of available tax instruments. In the present model
Z = {α,β}. We can then deﬁne the marginal cost of public funds:
Deﬁnition 1 (Social Marginal Cost of Public Funds (SMCPF)). The social
marginal cost of public funds (ηz) for a tax instrument (z) is the ratio between
the marginal social welfare of tax revenue for that tax instrument (κz) and the





For any optimal tax system the marginal social welfare of tax revenues must
be the same all tax instruments. Then the SMCPF can be measured for a marginal
uniform lump sum tax and it follows from equation (11a) that κ∗ = γ in the present
model. Under Deﬁnition 1 the following result therefore holds:
Proposition 1. The marginal cost of public funds according to Deﬁnition 1 is
always equal to one under an optimal tax system, i.e., η∗ = 1.
Proof. Suppose the tax system is optimal. Then the necessary ﬁrst order condi-
tions (11a)–(11d) are satisﬁed. Using the deﬁnition of social marginal utility of in-






and implies ηα = 1. Since the tax system us optimal we have ηα = ηβ = η∗,
where η∗ is the social marginal cost of public funds in an optimal tax system.
Accordingly η∗ = 1. 
utility of consumption plus the product of the shadow price on tax revenues and the change in tax
revenues due to a marginal transfer to the individual. This terminology follows Diamond (1975)
and Auerbach (1985, p. 87) but one may observe that the terminology is diﬀerent in, e.g., Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1975).
3See for instance Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994, equation (8)) and Pirt¨ al¨ a and Toumala
(1997) who analyse models with externalities.
8However, in the heterogeneous population case it is well known that under
‘standard’ assumptions β∗ ∈ (0,1).4 Therefore the average marginal social utility
of income will not coincide with the average marginal utility of income unless the
labour supply of all individuals is completely inelastic with respect to changes in
lump sum income.5
Proposition 1 holds for any optimal tax model: Regardless of how the tax sys-
tem is deﬁned, a necessary condition for an optimal tax system is that a marginal
perturbation of lump sum taxation/transfers or shift in the tax system must not
change social welfare.6 Or else the tax system would not be optimal. Since this
welfare diﬀerence is the marginal social welfare of additional tax revenues minus
the average marginal social utility of income and that the marginal cost of public
funds is the ratio between these two numbers, the result follows (in a sense) as a
tautology.
We can now compare this deﬁnition with existing ones from the literature. A
noteworthy overview is found in Ballard and Fullerton (1992). Most frequently a






Consider the case of κ
λ∗ and assume that taxes are non–optimal. If we assume, in
the present model, that we have the representative agent case then n = 1. In this
case, of course, E(γ) = γ. Then the diﬀerence between the two deﬁnitions is the
secondary eﬀects on tax revenues of a lump sum transfer to the individual. If we
believe that leisure is a normal good, then λ∗ > γ. For non–optimal tax systems,
therefore, the two measures do not coincide and the SMCPF for an income tax is
alwayslarger thanthe ﬁrstofthe standarddeﬁnitions ofthe MCPF.Thisdiﬀerence
disappears if we invoke conditions of optimality, in which case both measures are
equal to unity. 8
A representative agent framework, however, is problematic to use if one wants
to analyse distortionary taxation. Then the heterogeneous population assumption
seems reasonable and explicitly or implicitly, the average marginal utility of in-




i has been used in as a measure of the opportunity cost of
4See Sheshinski (1972), Hellwig (1986) and Svensson and Weibull (1986) for diﬀerent as-
sumptions to get this result.
5This of course also holds in a representative agent framework. Cf. Håkonsen (1998, Figure 1)
for the case where the elasticity of substitution is zero in a simulation using a CES utility function.
Then the SMCPF is equal to unity even if taxes are distortionary.
6See for instance Christiansen (1981).
7In the following we drop the individual speciﬁc index when n = 1.
8We already know that the SMCPF equals unity under optimal taxes. In the representative
agent case optimal taxes implies implies κ∗ = γi. Using (11b) β∗ = 0 follows. But then λ∗ = γi
and the result follows.
9marginal tax revenues. The MCPF is then written as κ
E(λ). Normality of leisure
still implies E(λ) > E(γ) and the principal diﬀerences between the two measures
of MCPF remain unchanged with the SMCPF larger than the MCPF. However, in-
voking an assumption of optimality of taxes will not restore the equality between
the measures.9
The case of κ/γ is analysed speciﬁcally by Håkonsen (1998, equation (7)).
However, he evaluates this measure under the constraint that a lump sum tax is
unfeasible (in our case α = 0) and that the proportional income tax is optimally
chosen (i.e., determined by (11b) with n = 1 and denoted β∗).10 Using the Slutsky
equation for labour supply his measure can be written as
κβ
γ








where the inequality follows from the compensated eﬀect on labour supply in the
denominator. It is the representative agent framework that is responsible for this
result; i.e., there is no other eﬀect that can counteract with the ineﬃciency due to
the proportional income tax. However, if the lump sum tax is unfeasible and the
proportional income tax is determined by (11b) but with n > 1 we get using the




















Although we know that the denominator as in the representative agent case is less
than unity (due to the compensated tax base eﬀect) we do not know whether the
enumerator is larger or smaller than unity; c.f., Dixit and Sandmo (1977, p. 421f).
Therefore, given the choice of tax system with no lump sum tax and an “optimal”
income tax, the result that the SMCPF is larger than unity in the representative
agent case does not carry over to a heterogeneous population situation. See also
the analysis below in section 6.2.
That the marginal cost of public funds is equal to one in a ﬁrst best tax sys-
tem has in the literature been attributed to the ﬁrst best character of the problem.
But taxes can be non–optimal even in a ﬁrst best situation and then the standard
9The heterogeneous population assumption is made by, e.g., Wilson (1991), Dahlby (1998)
and Sandmo (1998). Wilson (1991), however, does not use the concept of marginal cost of public
funds although he implicitly uses the social marginal cost of public funds as deﬁned by Deﬁnition
1 in this paper and that it equals unity under an optimal lump sum tax. Also Johansson-Stenman
(2001) analyses a cost–beneﬁt problem using a heterogeneous population assumption, but he is
not concerned with the marginal cost of public funds.
10The lump sum tax need not be zero, just not optimally chosen.
10deﬁnition of the MCPF will not equal unity. In this section, however, we have
redeﬁned the MCPF into the SMCPF according to Deﬁnition 1. Since the deﬁni-
tions considered do not diﬀer under ﬁrst best it means that this result is due to the
optimality of the tax system rather than the ﬁrst best character of the problem.
4 Aggregate social marginal beneﬁts and cost
Before we analyse the cost–beneﬁt criterion, which is done in the next section,
we here aim at identifying the aggregate social beneﬁts and costs of the public
projects. Consider ﬁrst the marginal beneﬁts of a public project. Suppose we can
ask an individual i about her valuation of a marginal increase in the project size
and get a truthful answer. The individual would answer that her private marginal
beneﬁt b0









i.e., the ratio between the private marginal utility of increasing the project size and
the private marginal utility of income.
In a situation where the policy maker has access to diﬀerentiated lump sum
taxes and therefore do not use distortionary taxation the policy maker would agree
with the private citizen: Equation (19) gives the social marginal beneﬁt to indi-
vidual i. However, in second best economies two things happens with the policies
that are employed. First, distortionary taxes tend to be used. Second, if lump
sum taxes at all are available they tend to be uniform and not diﬀerentiated on
individual characteristics. A policy maker will therefore value the beneﬁt to the
individual diﬀerently from how the individual makes the valuation. Taking these
two constraints on policy as given we can argue that the policy maker deﬁnes the








i.e., the ratio between the private marginal utility of increasing the project size and
the social marginal utility of income. Aggregating over individuals the aggregate








γi , where the inability to target a marginal lump sum transfer to or extract a
marginal lump sum tax from a speciﬁc individual is not taken into account in the
deﬁnition. We can then rewrite the original deﬁnition
Pn
i=1 B0



















The covariance term enters because of the policy maker’s inability to target lump
sum taxes and transfers to speciﬁc individuals. If diﬀerentiated taxes and transfers
are feasible and optimally chosen the social marginal utility of income is uniform
over the population and the covariance is zero. We can in a similar fashion rewrite
the deﬁnition of the aggregate social marginal beneﬁt
Pn
i=1 B0
i in terms of the ag-































Here the covariance term enters because of the distortionary income tax system
which creates a diﬀerence between the individual’s and the policy maker’s valu-
ation of the value oﬀ additional lump sum income to the individual. Whenever
distortionary taxes are not used then λi = γi ∀i and the covariance term is zero.
Note that this statement is made as if diﬀerentiated lump sum taxes were feasible;



































This decomposition takes into account that taxes are distortionary and that opti-
mal diﬀerentiated lump sum taxes are not used. We can now make two thought
experiments: First, suppose that the tax system is non–distortionary in the sense


























Still the aggregate social marginal beneﬁt deviates from aggregate private margi-
nal beneﬁt and this is because the government still only uses uniform lump sum
taxation to ﬁnance the public goods project. Although there are no distortions
created by the tax system, the restriction that only a uniform lump sum tax is
available prevents the policy maker to choose the desired income distribution and
12therefore the aggregate social marginal beneﬁt deviates from the aggregate private
marginal beneﬁt. The right–hand side of (24) is exactly how the aggregate social
marginalbeneﬁtwasexpressedbySandmo(1998), althoughheassumedthattaxes
were distortionary.
Sandmo (1998) calls the normalised covariance, expression A2 in (24), the
distributional characteristic of the public good. Given our deﬁnition of the social
marginal beneﬁt, however, we would call it the distributional characteristic of the
public good in a non–distortionary tax system; cf. Sandmo (1998, p. 372). The
general distributional characteristic of the public good with a distortionary tax
system is in our model given by expression A1 in equation (23).
This, however, does not mean that (24) can be used under distortionary ﬁ-
nancing. But since cov(λ,b0) = E(λb0)− E(λ)E(b0) the aggregate social marginal


















The right–hand side of (24) therefore has to be scaled with the factor
E(λ)
E(γ) to be
used under distortionary taxation.
Second, suppose that the government in addition uses optimal diﬀerentiated
lump sum taxes. Hence, this is a true ﬁrst best situation. This means that λi
are uniform over the population with the consequence that cov(λ,b0) = 0. Then
B0
i = b0
i ∀i. We can also see that this follows from (23): In this case γi = λi = E(λ)






Considering the social marginal cost (or the marginal shadow price of the pub-
lic good) is comparably easier. The private marginal cost is of course c0, but the
policy maker has to take into account that changing the project size will have indi-
rect eﬀects on the individuals. The direct welfare consequence is already consid-
ered on the beneﬁt side but there are indirect eﬀects through changed behaviour,
in this model changed labour supply, which will change the government’s tax rev-











If the public good project is a complement (substitute) to labour then the social
marginal cost (marginal shadow price) will be lower (higher) than the private
marginal cost.
11SeeWilson(1991)andSch¨ ob(1994)fortwoalternativewaystotreatthemarginalcostandthe
feedback on tax revenues of the size of the public project. Their purposes are, however, diﬀerent
from ours: Wilson (1991) has the purpose to investigate the ‘levels issue’, that is whether second
best provision of public goods implies a lower or higher level of the public good than ﬁrst best and
Sch¨ ob (1994) evaluates tax reforms.
135 Cost–beneﬁt under optimal taxes
Having deﬁned the social beneﬁts and costs we are now ready to consider the
cost–beneﬁt criterion for an optimal project size. The ﬁrst order condition (11c)

















      = 0. (27)






















     
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C0
. (28)
Given that the tax system is optimal it follows from Proposition 1 that η∗ =








i.e., aggregate social marginal beneﬁts should equal the social marginal cost at
the optimal project size. In a sense, this is hardly a surprising way of representing
the criterion in a second best situation: Deﬁning social marginal beneﬁts and costs
appropriately and choosing the tax system optimally (i.e., taking into account both
the use of the distortionary income tax and that only a uniform lump sum tax
is available, rather than diﬀerentiated lump sum taxes) means that all there is
to consider for the policy maker is considered. In particular, there is no wedge
between aggregate social beneﬁts and social costs in the form of a scaling factor
like the marginal cost of public funds. We can summarise these results as follows:
Proposition 2. If taxes are chosen optimally, then for an optimally sized marginal
project marginal social beneﬁts equal marginal social costs, i.e., the cost–beneﬁt
criterion (29) is satisﬁed.
Using the alternative deﬁnition of the social marginal beneﬁt Bi the cost ben-






















c0; i.e., implicitly the unity result for the SMCPF under an optimal tax system is invoked. On the
proper relationship between the cost–beneﬁt test for a public goods and the marginal cost of public
funds, see also Kaplow (1996).
14This alternative deﬁnition of the social marginal beneﬁt also means that we ex-
press the cost–beneﬁt test without the use of the social marginal cost of public
funds when taxes are optimal. However, the intuitive character of (29) is lost; i.e.,
that the optimal level of the public project is given by the balance of aggregate
social marginal beneﬁts and costs. Instead we get beneﬁts expressed in a form
where the inability of the policy maker to target lump sum taxes and transfers to
individuals is emphasised, under the the hypothetical assumption that taxes are
non–distortionary. Of course, the optimal level of the public project is unchanged
since this is just another way to present the ﬁrst order conditions.
We can also confront these ways of presenting the cost–beneﬁt tests with the
previous practise in the literature on the marginal cost of public funds. Using (25)
































E(λ) is marginal cost of public funds with the deﬁnition used by Sandmo
(1998) and the normalised covariance is his deﬁnition of the distributional charac-
teristic of the public good. This means that the consequences of the distortionary
tax system on the aggregate social marginal beneﬁts are captured captured by the
distributional characteristic and the marginal cost of public funds which appears
on the cost side. This gives a diﬀerent perspective on the standard deﬁnition of
the marginal cost of public funds: Even under an optimal tax system it does not
appear on the right–hand side in the cost–beneﬁt test to scale costs because of dis-
tortionary taxes. It appears on the cost side to scale costs because the beneﬁt side
is deﬁned as if taxes were non–distortionary in a situation where taxes are distor-
tionary. This should be compared with the cost–beneﬁt test (29) which together
with the decomposition (23) gives
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where the eﬀect of distortionary taxes is entirely on the left–hand side and divided
into a uniform lump sum eﬀect and a distortionary tax eﬀect as discussed in the
previous section.
156 Cost–beneﬁt under non–optimal taxes
Supposenowthatthetaxsystemisnotoptimalandthatthepolicymakerconsiders
a marginal increase in the public project. That increased project size could be
ﬁnanced by either a non–distortionary (α) or distortionary (β) tax increase or a



















Requiring a balanced budget for the policy change we get








     dα +













     dβ+ = C
0dg (35)
from a total diﬀerentiation of the budget constraint with respect to the two policy
parameters. Note that use was made of the deﬁnition of the marginal social cost
from equation (26).
Since the tax system is not optimal there is no reason why the two possible
ﬁnancing instrument should be associated with the same marginal cost of public
funds. We therefore, in turn, consider the non–distortionary tax and the distor-
tionary tax.
6.1 Non–distortionary taxation
First, setting dβ = 0 and using the deﬁnition of the aggregate social marginal
beneﬁt equation (34) implies
dW = E(γ)
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     . (36)













where the last equality follows with the use of (12a) and the deﬁnition of the




















C0 ≥ ηα. (38)
16The strict equality above refers to the case when the project is (locally) optimally





= 0 for an optimal
lump sum tax it follows that
ηα ≷ 1 ⇔ increase
decrease α (39)
to improve welfare.
Let us ﬁrst look at the case where the marginal project is not (in a local sense)
optimally sized. Suppose that ηα < 1. Then the cost beneﬁt test (38) may call
for an increased project size even if
Pn
i=1 B0
i < C0; i.e., the policy maker will
undertakemarginalprojectswhichareinthissensetoocostlybecauseitisameans
to compensate for lump sum taxes being too high. Similarly, if ηα > 1, then the




This can be interpreted as a way to compensate for too low lump sum taxation;
i.e., only marginal projects for which beneﬁts exceed costs suﬃciently will be
undertaken.








The results now become a bit stronger: If ηα < 1 then aggregate marginal so-
cial beneﬁts will fall short of marginal social costs (
Pn
i=1 B0
i < C0) at the optimal
project size to compensate for too low lump sum taxation. If ηα > 1 then aggre-
gate marginal social beneﬁts exceeds marginal social costs (
Pn
i=1 B0
i > C0) at the
optimal project size to compensate for too high lump sum taxation.
6.2 Distortionary taxation
A similar analysis can be applied to the case of distortionary taxation. Setting














     . (41)













17where the last equality follows from (12b) and the deﬁnition of the SMCPF (Def-
inition 1). Substituting for dβ in equation (36) and rearranging we get
dW
dg



































∂β is the elasticity of the compensated tax base with
respect to the proportional income tax and ˜ ηβ is the critical value for the MCPF
at which the distortionary tax is optimal for any given value on α.14 From (11a)
and (11b)we know that
cov(yi,γi)
yγ = εs
yβ if taxes are optimally chosen. That is, any
thought experiment starting with ˜ ηβ = 1 requires that also α is optimal which is
not necessarily the case. This means that if we cannot generally draw the same
type of conclusions in this case of marginal distortionary ﬁnance as in the case
of non–distortionary ﬁnance; we need to estimate the critical value ˜ ηβ which is
hard because not only the estimation of the compensated labour supply function
isneededbutalsotheexactcardinalisationoftheindividualutilityfunctionchosen
by the policy maker.
In order to draw the same type of conclusions we can consider the special case
in which we make the evaluation at a point at which the lump sum tax is actually
optimal. In that case, had β also been optimal then ˜ ηβ must equal unity. Consider
then a small deviation of the proportional tax when it is above its optimum level.
In that case, naturally, the policy maker would like to decrease the proportional
tax again. That implies ˜ ηβ < 1; i.e, the equity component in the denominator
of ˜ ηβ is smaller than the eﬃciency component in the numerator. Similarly, for
a proportional tax slightly below the optimal level ˜ ηβ > 1 and the policy maker
would like to increase the proportional tax. That is, whenever the lump sum tax is
optimal, then
ηβ ≷ 1 ⇔ increase
decrease β (45)
13Compare with Dixit and Sandmo (1977, equation (16)) where a similar condition for an op-
timal value of β is derived. Note however, that (44) is derived from (11b) only without the use of
(11a).
14Compare with equation (18). The measure of ηβ in this equation need not coincide with ˜ ηβ
since the former is derived under the restriction that α = 0 and not only given at some arbitrary
level. Notealsothatthetopindex sdenotescompensatedsupplyandthatattheindividualoptimum
Hicksian labour supply equals Marshallian labour supply so that ys
i = yi ∀i = 1,...,n.
18and the conclusion from the non–distortionary ﬁnancing case holds: Whenever




C0; i.e., the policy maker will undertake marginal projects which are in this sense
too costly because it is a means to compensate for too high income taxation. Sim-




i > C0; i.e., some beneﬁcial projects will not be undertaken to
compensate for too low income taxation.
As in the case of non–distortionary taxation the conclusions become stronger







Therefore, if the lump sum tax is optimal and if ηβ < 1, then aggregate marginal
social beneﬁts will fall short of marginal social costs (
Pn
i=1 B0
i < C0) at the optimal
project size to compensate for too low income taxation. If the lump sum tax is




i > C0) at the optimal project size to compensate for too high
income taxation.
7 Conclusions
The object of analysis in this paper has been a deﬁnition of the marginal cost of
public where the opportunity cost of additional tax revenue is set to be the policy
maker’s valuation of a marginal unit of income to an individual (in a representa-
tiveindividualframework)oritspopulationaverageinaheterogeneouspopulation
framework. This deﬁnition, called the social marginal utility of income, has the
property of being equal to unity whenever the tax system is optimal. The relation-
ship between the social marginal cost of public funds and other deﬁnitions were
performed. It was argued that the standard deﬁnition of the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds is used (i.e., when the individual’s marginal utility of income was used
as the opportunity cost of tax revenues or its population average in the heteroge-
neous population case) was always smaller. Measures of the social marginal ben-
eﬁts and costs, congruent with the social marginal cost of public funds where also
derived. Cost beneﬁt test under optimal and non–optimal taxes where analysed. It
was shown that, even if taxes are optimal, the standard deﬁnition of the marginal
cost of public funds appears in the cost–beneﬁt test, not because taxes are distor-
tionary, but because taxes are distortionary but beneﬁts are deﬁned as if tax are
non–distortionary. Under non–optimal taxes it was shown that the interpretation
of the social marginal cost of public funds was that it is a wedge forcing the cost
19beneﬁt analyst to compensate for the non–optimality of taxes. This wedge can be
larger or smaller than a critical value. If larger the cost–beneﬁt test should reject
some projects for which the social marginal beneﬁt exceeds the social marginal
costs to compensate for a too low overall level of taxation. If smaller the analyst
should accept some projects even if the social marginal beneﬁt is smaller than the
social marginal cost to compensate for a too high overall level of taxation.
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